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rN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

BRENT "W" BROWN,

*

Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

*

GERALDINE K. BROWN,

*

Defendant/Respondent.

PETITION FOR
WRIT OF CERTIORARI

*

Court of Appeals Case No,
890293-CA

*

QUESTION FOR REVIEW
Defendant/Respondent, Geraldine K. Brown, by and thiouyh
counsel hereby petitions the I'tah Supreme Court for a Writ; of
Certiorari to review the decision of the Utah Court of
Appeals, the Honorable Judges Bench, Davidson, and Ormer
entered on or about August 31, 1990.

Defendant requests this

Court to review the following issue?
1.

Is the Utah Court of Appeals Order vacating the

trial court's award of attorney's Eees and failing to award
attorney fees on appeal in conflict with prior decision of the
Utah Supreme Court, the Utah Court of Appeals, the generally
sanctioned rule of law, and the Panel's own guidelines in
light of the numerous other cases regarding award of attorney
fees in divorce actions.

REFERENCE TO COURT OF APPEALS OPINION
The unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals was
issued on or about August 31, 19^0.

A copy thereof is

included in the appendix.

Dei^nd.int

only se^ks this C'ouit's

levi^w of I he Court of App^aln tuJInq on attoiney feon, both
at ti iaJ and on appeal.

JUR1SI) F CT 1 0HA1, STATFJMENT
The Order and Judgment

which modified a 1986 Decree of

Divorce previously entered was signed and entered by the First
Disttict Coutl, tlif3 Honorable VeNoy Chr i s tof f ersen , on Api i I
7, 1989.

The Notice of Appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals

was filed May 4, 1989.

The HI ah Court of Appeals issued

its

opinion on August 31, 1990.

Ho rehearing has been requested.

This Coin t has jurisdiction

to j^view the decision in question

by Wilt of Certiorari

by virtue of H I P Constitution of Utah,

Article 8, Section 1, et s e c ,
Annotated

78-?-! <*i . sec. Utah Codo

1953 as amended, and Rules 45 and 46 of the Utah

Rules of Appellate Procedure.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The controlling statute

in this action, Section

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
as follows:

"The C o m c

sum of money . . .

}0~3-3,

This section provides

may order either party to pay . . .

a

to enable such party to prosecute oi del end

[a divorce or modification] action."
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE
This case is an action filed by Defendant, Geraldine K.
Brown, to modify a Decree of Divorce, requesting an increase
in child support and alimony as well as requesting attorney's
fees for bringing this matter to court.

Although technically

a modification action, in reality the Court was requested to
establish reasonable child support and alimony based on
Plaintiff's historical and then current income due to the fact
the Plaintiff was temporarily unemployed at the time of the
original divorce hearing.

Plaintiff had been re-employed

earning a substantial income when the Petition to Modify was
filed.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Decree of Divorce was entered in the above-en LiUed
matter on or about March 28, _1986.

(Record Volume I ("R-l")

p. 50)
Defendant filed her Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce
on or about December 14, 1987.

(R-I p. 87)

Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents
were issued to Plaintiff on or about January 8, 1988.
(R-l

p. 106)
On or about August 31, 1988, the January 8, 1988

Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents still
having not been answered, Defendant again filed a Second
3

Motion to Compel Discovery.

(R-L pp. 133-138)

Defendant had

filed numerous objections to PLaintiff's requests for
extension of time.
Plaintiff's then acting attorney, J.yJe W. HilLyard
HJhLYARD, ANDERSON f* OLSEN, filed a withdrawal of counsel on
OJ about September 2, 1988.

(R-L p. 140)

On or about September 20, 1988, the Court granted
Defendant's Motion to Compel Discovery, allowing 10 day^ to
comply with the discovery order and further ordered that
Attorney HiJlyard's withdiawal would not be recognized until a
notice in writing was furnished to the Court from Plaintiff
personally indicating that Piamtjff had terminated the
attorney-client relationship.

(R-f p. 142)

No written

notices were ever provided by Plaintiff.
Plaintiff's trial attorney, Richard B. Johnson, entered
his appearance on or about September 29, 1988.

(R-J p. 145)

Partial Answers to Defendant's First Set of
interrogatories and Responses to Defendant's Requests for
Production of Documents were issued on or about October 3,
1988.

(R-i pp. 147-227)
Defendant issued a Notice of Readiness for Trial on or

about October 11, 1988.

(R~l p. 278)

On or about October 25, L988, a hearing on the Petition
was set for January 17, 1989.

(R~I p. 230)

On or about November 8, 1988, Defendant again filed a
Motion to Compel Discovery (actually the third such formal
motion) requesting the Court to order Plaintiff to answer
4

interrogatories and Requests for Production not fully
responded to in Plaintiff's October 3, 1988 responses.
pp.

(R-!

2.12-242)
No responses to Defendant's [lotion to Compel being

received by the Court, the Court granted Defendant's Second
Motion to Compel Discovery on or about December 7, 1988.

(R-I.

pp. 243, 247)
On or about December 14, 1988, Defendant filed her Answer
to Plaintiff's Interrogatories.

The documents attached to

Defendant's Answers to Plaintiff's Interrogatories were
referred to extensively in 1 he tiial of this matter.
PP.

(R~fl

J-16)
On or about December 16, 1988, Plaintiff filed his

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to
Defendant's Second Motion to Compel Discovery-

(R-II pp. L9-

23)
Plaintiff provided some additional information at that
time.

(R-1I pp. 62-85)
On or about December 27, or more than two months after

the trial date had been set, Plaintiff filed a Motion for
Continuance of the January 17, 1989 trial date.

(R-II pp. 92-

95)
On or about January 3, 1989, the Court issued its Order
for Default upon Defendant's request, in that Plaintiff had
failed to respond to Defendant's Second Motion to Compel
Discovery on or before Decern!or 23, 1988, as ordered by the
Court on or about December 15, 1988.
5

Plaintiff's Answer and

Countpi-Petition were ordeied

to be stricken and the CJptk wan

ordered to enter Plaintiff's Default on the Petition to Modify
the Decree of Divoice.

(R-JJ

pp. 97-104)

Depositions W ^ T O lipid on or about
On 01 about

January r? , lC|8n, Defendant

to Plaintiff's Motion
L0r))

January 4, 1989.
filed an Object inn

Loi Continuance of Trial.

(R IJ p.

Defendant reminded the "ourt of Plaintiff's numpiou^

del ays.
No Order continuing
Court.

tl\p trial was ever entered by the

However, in a telephone confeience with thp Clark's

Offjre, the Clerk indicated that the Court had denied
Plaintiff's Motion to Continue thp tiial and that thp ti Lai
was still scheduled for Januaty 17 r 1989.
On January

17, 1989, Defendant appeared

in person, and

with counsel and necessary witnesses for the trial.
Plaintiff's counsel, Richard H. Johnson was present and
indicated

that Plaintiff was not available bpcausp he left thp

country for vacation in South Ameiica.

After discussion with

counsel in the Judge's chambPLS, the trial was continued to
February 28, 1989.

(R-l p. 246)

not on the record, objected

Defendant's counsel, though

to the continuance indicating to

the Court that the continuance would be prejudicial
Defendant unless the Court made

to

its Order retroactive to the

date of the filing of Defendant's Petition to Modify.
Trial on the Petition to Modify was lipid on Fpbiuary 28 r
1989, before the Honorable Judge VeNoy Chiistoffersen.

6

The C o u r t ' s M e m o r a n d u m
March

3, 1 9 8 9 , g r a n t i n g

i n c r e a s i n g o 11 i1d
$ 7 0 0 . 0 0 per m o n t h
per m o n t h
fees.

attorney's

per

Notice

had

fees and

in a t t o r n e y ' s

Dofendant's

child,

issued

Petit J o n

increasing

p e r month
offered
ability

fees.

and

on or

about

to M o d i f y

alimony

awarding

testimony

from

and

$200.00

$3,000.00

of her need

to pay and had

(R-II pp.

of W i t h d r a w a l

attorney, Richard

was

s uppo r t f ro m $ 30 0.0 0 pe r m o r 1t h p e r c h i 1 d t < >

to $ 5 0 0 . 0 0

Defendant

Decision

attorney

for

requested

$4,000.00

138-141)

of c o u n s e l

was

filed

B. J o h n s o n , on or a b o u t M a r c h

by

Plaintiff's

3 0 , 1989.

(R-II p. 142)
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of haw and an Order and
Judgment on the Petition to Modify were filed with the Court
on or about Harch 30, 1989, and signed by the Court on or
about April 7, 1989.

(R-II }>. 145-154)

Notice of Entry of Judgment was issued on or about April
19, 1989 (R-II p. 155)
Notice of Appeal was issued by Lyle W. Hillyard,
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN, attorneys for Plaintiff, on or
about May 4, 1989.

(R-II p. 1.57)

The Court of Appeals Issued its decision August 31, 1990,
remanding the case for more adequate findings of fact and
reversing the trial court's award of attorney fees.

The Court

of Appeals did not award costs or fees on appeal.

DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT
The Court issued a Memorandum Decision

granting

Defendant's Petition to Modify the Decree and awarding child
7

support for two children at $/00.00 per month per child and
alimony at $500.00 per month.

The Court had earlier, dining

the trial, denied Defendant's petition to require Plaintiff to
pay approximately $4,000.00 for costs incurred related
home awarded to Defendant in the original divorce.

to the

That order

is not appealed.
T h e Cou rt o r d e r e d t h a t the m o d i f i c a t i o n of chi1d
and

alimony

first

be e f f e c t i v e

scheduled

for

trial

as of J a n u a r y
of

1 7 , 1 9 8 9 , the

the P e t i t i o n

to

s u \ i po r t

date

Modify.

Defendant was also awarded $3,000.00 as attorney's

fees

and costs.

DISPOSITION AT COURT OF APPEALS
The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court
to enter more adequate findings or to take additional
evidence, as may be needed on the issues of child support and
alimony.
The Court of Appeals also vacated the trial court's order
on attorney's fees with no costs or fees awarded on appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The parties were divorced by a Decree of Divorce on

March 28, 1986.
2.

Immediately prior to the trial, or through Novpmber

of 1985, Defendant was employed at Integrated

Systems

Engineering, Inc., a company originally founded by Plaintiff

8

and two other individuals, and subsequently sold.

(TT p. 1J9,

1. 16 - p. 21f 1. 10)
3.

Brent Brown's gross income from wages, salaries, and

interest in 1985, the year jura prior to the divorce, exceeded
$147,000.00.

(TT p. 22, 1. 20 - p. 23, 1. 2)

(See also page

1 of Plaintiff's Exhibit No. I in Addendum 5.)
4.

During the Court's bench ruling in the original

divorce, the Court indicatd that due to Plaintiff's apparent
ability to earn a substantia.! income, and his testimony that
he was not now employed, it \ M S necessary to impute an income
figure in order to establish fhild support.

The Court

arbitrarily chose a figure of $54,000.00 per annum and
established child support at $300.00 per month per child for
three children.

(TT p. 3, 1. 22, to p. 4, 1. 11)

(Ssee also

copy of Reporter's Transcript of Court's Bench Ruling, R-II
pp. 127-134)

The Court then reviewed its concerns with both

counsel regarding establishing alimony.

The Court stateds

. . . the NELSON I think is the latest one out
— recites all of those factors you talk about
on alimony and the purpose of it, and it is to
maintain as close as you can the same standard of
living after divorce as before the divorce with
factors of needs on one hand and ability to pay
on the other.
The ability at the present time to pay, of
course, is not there, but I assume it will be in
the future, and the court can, of course, on any
change of circumstances, as you know, take that
into account; but I will award alimony that can be
changed on any change in the situtation of income
and I'll award $200.00 a month alimony. That's,
as you understand, where there's a substantial
change in circumstances this can be brought back
if you can't agree on what that then should be.
And certainly it would be a substantial change of
9

circumstances to go from zero income to, say,
$60,000.00 a year or $25,000.00 maybe. (TT p. 4,
L. 13 to p. 5, 1. 4.) (See also R-TI p. 129 1. 22
- p. 130 1. 13. )
5.

Pursuant to Plaintiff's 1986 Federal Income Tax

Return, Plaintiff's income from wages, salaries, interest,
dividends, and severence pay, in J986 was $51,350.00.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 2)

(See also page 1 of Plaintiff's Ex. 2

in Addendum 5)
6.

Plaintiff's 1987 Federal Income Tax Return indicated

income from wages, salaries, interest, dividends, and rents in
excess of $140,000.00.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 3)

(See also

page 2 of Plaintiff's Ex. 3 in Addendum 5)
7.

Plaintiff's personal financial statement to Zions

First National Bank dated September 15, 1988, approximately
five months prior to trial, indicated Plaintiff's income to be
$130,000.00 per year with total liabilities of $56,000.00 and
total net worth of $1,157,000.00.

(Defendant's Exhibit 3)

(See also in Addendum 5)
8.

Plaintiff's net worth at or about the time of the

divorce was approximately $430,000.00.

(computed from

Findings of Fact, R~I pp. 47-48)
9.

Defendant's income for the three years in question

was as follows:
YEAR

INCOME

1986
1987
1988

$26,406.00
$28,734.00
$21,785.00

(See R-II, p. 7

Also Addendum 6)
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10.

Defendant's expenses for the tliree years in question

were as follows*
YRAR

EXPENSES
$29 , 3Rri . 00
$28,523.00
$25,500.00

1986
1987
1988
(See R-II, p. 7-8.

11.

Also Addendum 6)

Defendant's net income after expenses for the three

years in question was:
YEAR

NET INCOME

1986
1987

$-

1988
(See R-II, p. 7.
12.

- 3,715.00
Also Addendum

6)

Defendant's net worth as of the date of trial is

approximately $431,368.00
13.

2,979.00
211.00

(See R-II, p. 13.

Brent Brown purchased Integrated Systems Engineering

("ISE") in or about November of 1986.
voluntary.
14.
1.

Also Addendum 6)

The sale was completely

(R-II pp. 25-85)
ISE is wholly owned by Brent Brown.

(TT p. 26,

9-10)
15.

The total equity of ISE on or about January 31,

1988, was approximately $1,032,000.00.

(Defendant's Ex. 2,

Addendum 5)
16.

Defendant's attorney's fees were approximately

$4,000.00, incurred mostly because of Plaintiff's refusal to
cooperate in the action.
17.

Defendant's only assets are her home, furniture,

automobile, and investments necessary to produce a small
11

amount of income.

Any reduction in income producing assets

also reduces the income avaJL'jle to Defendant.
18.

Defendant's income from all sources, including child

support and alimony, does not even cover her living expenses,
which Defendant has had to maintain at a very modest level.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The Court of Appeals' decision vacating the tilal

court's awatd of attorney fees and failing to award attoiney
fees on appeal is in conflict with tin* decisions of the Utah
Supreme Court and other panels of the Court of Appeals.
Rather than leaving the decision regarding attorney fees lo
the sound discretion of the trial court based on need and
ability of each party, the disposition at trial and the
conduct of the parties, the panel has ruled that Defendant ran
only be awarded attorney fees if she has no ability whatsoever
to cover the costs of litigation.

Basically, Defendant must

be indigent to be awarded attorney fees.

Furthermore, the

Panel's decision has completely departed from the accepted
cource of judicial proceeding in the issue of awarding
attorney Eees in a divorce action, which has always treated
attorney fees as a marital debt to be divided based on need
and ability of each party to pay.

The Panel also failed to

follow its own guidelines in ''oiling to detail the facts upon
which the Panel reversed its decision.

The Panel only stated,

"In light of Appellee's significant assets . . . "
is the Panel referring to?

12

What assets

ARGUMENTS
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDE!) THE ISSUE
OF ATTORNEY FEES CONTRARY TO ITS OWN
FINDINGS AND CONTRARY TO THIS COURTS
PREVIOUS DECISIONS.
The Supreme Court of Utah, the Court of Appeals, and, to
the knowledge of Defendant's attorney, the First District
Court, have all been consistent in awarding attorney's fees in
divorce actions.

Attorney's fees are awardable in the trial

court's discretion based upon the need of the requesting
party, the reasonableness of the fees requested and the
necessity of the fees.

The question in this action Is what

constitutes "need" on the part of the Defendant and who should
determine that need, the trial court who heard a full day's
evidence or the Court of Appeals based on an inanimate
record?
The panel in this action lias determined that Defendant
has significant assets and is therefore not in need of
assistance to cover her attorney's fees.

The panel neglected,

however, to specify what "significant assets" the panel is
referring to, contrary to its own decision requiring the trial
court to formulate specific findings to support its decision.
We, therefore, have no idea what significant assets the panel
is referring to.

The panel further indicates that in order to

be awarded attorney's fees, Defendant, "in essence, . . . muni,
show that she would be 'unable to cover the costs of
litigation.'"

Basically, the panel is requiring Defendant to
J3

be i n d i g e n t

t o be a w a r d e d a t t o r n e y ' s

fees,

v/hich i s

absolutely

contrary to prior orders of this Court and other decisions in
the Court of Appeals.
In HUCK v. HUCK, 734 P.2d 417, (Utah 1986) this Court
reaffirmed the standard for awarding attorney's fees, and
stated t
In divorce cases, an awawl of attorney's fees must
be supported by evidence that it Is reasonable in
amount and reasonably needed by the party requesting
the award. BEALS v. BEALS, G82 P.?d 862 (Utah
1984). Plaintiff contends that there is no evidence
to support a finding of financial need on the part
of defendant to justify the award of fees to
defendant. He presented evidence that her total
income from all sources including support payments
totaled $1,795.00 per month and that therefore she
should be capable of bearing the costs of litigation.
However, defendant had no liquid assets and even
using plaintiff's figures as to her gross income
from all sources, her income barely covered her
expenses. Her attorney testified at trial as to the
reasonableness of the time spent and fees charged.
The trial court awarded her less than one-third of
the amount she sought. She met her burden of showing
financial need and provided evidence that the fees
awarded to the plaintiff ($2,750) were reasonable.
In the instant action, the uncontroverted evidence
clearly indicates that Defendant's current living expenses
greatly exceed her current income.

In 1988 alone, her

expenses exceeded her income by more than $3,700.00, or more
than the attorney's fees awarded by the trial court.

Even

with the child support and alimony award as modified and
ordered by the trial court, Defendant's income is
substantially lower than Plaintiff's income.
Although Defendant has some assets which could be
liquidated to pay her attorney's feps, any liquidation of
J4

assets also impacts negatively on her income.

Defendant's

only assets are her home, furniture, automobile, and her
income producing investments.

The uncontroverted testimony at

trial was that Defendant's net worth had diminished sinro tho
time of the divorce while Plaintiff's net worth had almost
tripled, to nearly $1,200,000.00.
At trial, Defendant's counsel submitted an Affidavit of
all attorney's fees which was accepted by Plaintiff and
stipulated to by Plaintiff as being jeasonable.

Defendant's

attorney testified as to the ieasonableuess of the fees, I ho
amount, and the necessity of the fees, and the need for time
spent on the case.

Although Plaintiff had no questions

regarding the testimony of Defendant's attorney, Plaintiff's
counsel did indicate that he did not believe that Defendant
had established sufficient factors to merit an award of
attorney's fees.

The exchange between the parties was as

follows:
Mr, Johnson: 1 don't have any questions. Except
that under the case law, counsel has not established a
foundation for [an] award of attorney's fees. We would
object to the Affidavit on that basis.
•

• •

The Court?

Where is the foundation lacking?

Mr. Johnson! He has to establish need on behalf of his
client. You know he's got to have testimony relative to
what's reasonable. Just the standard guidelines out, of
the latest case.
The Court?

Yes, he testified himself, I assume that

Mr. Johnsons My client then testifies relative to
attorney's fees.
The Courts

She testified as to a need.
15

Mr.

Johnson:

The Court:
Mr.

Johnson:

Then I didn't hear that.
1 did.
J just missed jt.

(TT p. 134 125- p. 135 121)
The trial court specifically held that Defendant had

established

a need f o r

attorney's

fees.

Judge

Christnff^rsen

in his Memorandum Decision slated:
Defendant is also asking attorney's f^es for this.
Section 30-30-3 of the 0.C.A. has been
interpreted to include actions for modification.
Sep KALLAS v. KAT.LAS, 614 P.?d 641.
Plaintiff's
ability to pay attorney' «•? Tees is obviously much
gieater than that of Defendant, Defendant only
having income that she ieaJizes from investment of
funds she received from the divorce plus her child
suppoit and alimony.
Defendant's counsel testified
as to the hours and necessity of the amount of
hours for the purpose of this hearing and the
reasonableness of his hourly fee with a figure of
around $4,000.00 attorney's fees.
Flowever, in
checking over this exhibit showing the amount of
time spent, mainly concerning the cost of the curb
and gutter. The Court feels there were some items
which were not necessary and therefore reduced the
attorney's foes award to 31,000.00 opposed to
$4,000.00, plus costs.
(n.L). p.4)
Prior decisions of this Court and the Court of Appeals
are very consistent that attorney's fees are awarciable at the
discretion of the trial court based on need and
reasonableness.
In

For example:

SINCLAIR v. SINCLAIR, 718 P.?d 396 (Utah 1986),

court stated*
The award of attorney's fees was proper wheie H I P
record showed defendant's need based upon the tact
that her monthly expenses exceeded her monthly
income and the attorney testified as to the reasonableness of his fees.
718 P.2d at 398

16

this

In OSGUTHORPE v. OSGUTHORPE, 791 P.2d 895 (Utah App
J 990), the Utah Court of Appeals statedi
Defendant claims plaintiff has sufficient means to
pay her attorney fees incurred on appeal in liqht
of the court's findings that plaintiff is capable
of finding good, gainful employment, the award of
alimony and child support, and th<* property distribution. However, the trial court found that
plaintiff did not have the ability to pay her
attorney fees incurred at trial and that defendant
should pay a portion of plaintiff's attorney fees.
Because those findings are supported by the evidence
we award plaintiff her costs and reasonable attorney
fees incurred on appeal and remand to the trial court
for determination of rearonable attorney fees
plaintiff has incurred on appeal. 791 P. 2d 89(5
Jn MUNNS v. MUNNS, 790 P.2d

I1G (Utah App J 990), the

Court of Appeals declined to award attorney's fees, agaiti
defering to the court's discretion, the court stated:
Appellant alleges that the trial court abused its
discretion by failing to award her attorney's fees.
She states that she should have been awarded
attorney fees because the record is repleat with
evidence that she is in dire need of financial
assistance, having no income other than alimony and
child support and no liquid assets or marketable
skills, while respondent has a steady job and
liquid assets. On the other hand, respondent
alleges that appellant did not demonstrate need
because her property is virtually debt-free and she
would be receiving a $9,000.00 judgment over the
space of two years from which she could pay the
attorney fees.
To recover attorney fees in a divorce action, the
moving party must show evidence (1) establishing
the financial need of the requesting party, and (?)
demonstrating the reasonableness of the amount of
the award. (citations ommitted]
Where either of
these two factors have not. been shown, we have
reversed awards of attorney fees.
[citations
ommitted]
The parties both succeeded in establishing their
respective financial need, and the attorney
piesented evidence demons t rat ing t lie teasonableness
17

of their r^spec tjve fees. Therefore, the trial
court would hav e been jus ti fied in awarding either
Howev er, while the trial
party attorney fees.
court may award attorney fe es in divorce
proceedings , pu rsuant to litah Code Annotated
Section 30-3-^ (1989) [ci t a tion ommitted] the
decision to awa rd attorne y fees lies primarily
within the trj aJ court's so und di seretion.
[citations omm itted] Undler the present, circumstances, jn whi ch either pa rty reasonably has the
ability to pay the othei pn rty's attorney fees,
we do not find that the t i j al court abused its
discretion in o rdering each parly to pay his or hoi
own attorney fe es.
7 90 P\ 2d at 127, 123 [emphasis
added]

It, has fuither been the common practicp of the current
judges in the First District, the Honorable Gordon J. Low and
the Honorable F. L. Gunnel 1, to tieat both parties attorney
fees in a divorce action essentially as marital debts and to
award attorney fees based on a review and percentage of each
parly's income in order to establish need.

To assist

counsel

in reviewing the issue of attorney fees in order to settle
divorce actions, the First District Judges have indicated

that

they, based on the evidence and needs of each specific action,
will generally compare the income of the potential

paying

party, less support and alimony, to the income of the proposed
receiving party, including child support and alimony, and to
allocate total attorney fees incurred based on the percentage
difference of the parties' adjusted income.
Neither the trial court, the prior

decisions of th^ Utah

Supreme Court, nor the Utah Court of Appeals require one party
to show that he or she is tot,ally without
attorney's fees to be entitled
fees .

means to pay

to an award of attorney's

In the instant action, the trial court, in exercising Its
discretion after hearing considerable testimony and dealing
with numerous other issues in this case prior to the hearing,
awaided Defendant $3,000.00 in attorney's fees based on the
fact that her expenses greatly exceeded her income, that
Plaintiff's income greatly exceeded Defendant's income, and
that Defendant should not be required to liquidate assets to
pay the attorney fees.

The Court of Appeals can only vacate

the award of attorney fees if there are no facts to support
the trial court's decision.
P.2d 121 (Utah App. 1988).

THROCKMORTON v. THROCKMORTON, 76/
The Court of Appeals' decision is

not only contrary to prior case law on attorney fees, but, is
inappropriate in failing to follow the proper standard of
review on appeal,

CONCLUSION
Judge Christoffersen properly determined that Defendant
was in need of assistance in paying her attorney fees.

The

Court of Appeals, however, without specifically indicating
what assets were available, ruled that Defendant could only be
awarded attorney fees if she were indigent.

Defendant is

certainly unable to cover the costs of the litigation and the
Panel's decision is incorrect and inconsistent with prior case
law and the usual course of judicial pioceecllngs.
Defendant respectfully requests this Court to grant this
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to consider the correctness of
the Court of Appeal's decision regarding attorney foes, both
at trial and on appeal.
19

DATED this

day of September, 1990.

Jewell
^\
Cor Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF HAILING
1 hereby certjfy that on t he
day of September,
3 q 90, t mailed a true and correct copy f tlip foregoing
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI to the following persons,
postage pre-paid thereon, by depositing the same in the United
States Hail.
Lyle W. Hillyard
HtLLYARD, ANDERSON fc 01.SEN
175 East 100 North
Logan, UT 84321

•
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Before Judges Bench, Davidson, and Orme.
BENCH, Judge:
Appellant Brent W. Brown appeals an order that modified
his decree of divorce by increasing the amount of alimony and
child support payments he is to pay to appellee. Appellant
claims that the trial court abused its discretion in increasing
alimony and child support payments when (1) the appellee failed
to meet her burden of showing a substantial change in
circumstances necessitating the increase/(2) the appellee
produced no evidence of a necessity for the increases or of her
inability to aid in her own and the children's support, and (3)
the trial court made no findings regarding necessity and
ability.
FINDINGS OF FACT
It is reversible error if a trial court fails to make
findings on all material issues unless the facts in the record
are "clear, uncontroverted, arc1 capable of supporting only a
finding in favor of the judgment." Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d
233, 236 (Utah L983). These findings "should be sufficiently
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the

steps bvr which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issup
was reached." AcJLQ njy_._ DeJLiran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utali 1987)
(quoting Rucker v. Dal ton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979))..
The trial court's findings in the present case do not include
sufficient detail for us to determine what steps it took in
reaching its conclusions as to the material issues that must be
considered prior to modifying a divorce decree. In fact, the
findings are so sparse we do not know if the material issues
were even considered.
"The threshold requirement for relief [in a petition to
modify a divorce decree] is a showing of a substantial change
of circumstances occurring since the entry of the decree and
not contemplated in the decree itself." Naylor v. Navlor, 700
P.2d 707, 710 (Utah 1985)In the present case, the trial
court failed to make any specific findings on appellant's
ability to pay, which is the alleged substantial change in
circumstances. In particular, the trial court's determination
that appellant's income was somewhere within a very broad range
was insufficient to establish appellant's income—a critical
factor in determining the larger question of his ability to
pay. Because we do not know the factual basis for the trial
court's conclusion that a substantial change in circumstances
had occurred, we cannot determine whether appellee met her
burden of proving this threshold requirement. Nor can we
determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in so
finding,
In awarding alimony, the trial court must consider eacli
of the following three factors: "(1) the financial conditions
and needs of the receiving spouse; (2) the ability of the
receiving spouse to produce a sufficient income for him o'r
herself; and (3) the ability of the responding spouse to
provide support." Throckmorton v. Throcknorton, 767 P.2d 121,
124 (Utah Ct. App. 198C) . In the present case the trial court
failed to make specific findings concernirg any of these
factors. In particular, the trial court made no findings as to
appellee's ability to work. S&g, e.q f , Higlev v. Hicrley, 676
P.2d 379, 382 (Utah 1983). The record is also "void of any
facts as to [appellant's] or [appellee's] monthly expenses
which are relevant both to [appellee's] 'reed' and
[appellant's] ability to pay," TJbX9X?iU30ftrJ;Qin, 767 P. 2d at 125.
Again, we are unable to determine whether the trial court's
order increasing alimony was within its discretion because we
do not know upon what factual basis it rests.
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In determining child support the trial court must
consider the following factors enumerated in Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-45-7(2) (1987):
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)

the standard of living and situation of the parties;
the relative wealth and income of the parties;
the ability of the obligor to earn;
the ability of the obligee to earn;
the need of the obligee;
the age of the parties;
the responsibility of the obligor for the support of
others.

Failure to consider these statutory factors is an abuse of
discretion. Durfee v. Durfee, 140 Utah Adv. Rep. 42, 43-44
(Ct. App. 1990). The trial court in the present case has not
indicated that it considered any of these statutory factors.
We are therefore precluded from reviewing the merits of its
award.
The trial court failed to make adequate factual findings
concerning the substantial change in circumstances and the
other material factors identified above. Inasmuch as the
record is not clear and uncontroverted and capable of only
supporting the trial court's award of increased alimony and
child support, we vacate the trial court's order and remand for
further proceedings to take additional evidence on these
factors, as needed, and for entry of findings concerning each
factor identified above and any other material factor which may
arise. While we do not approve or disapprove of the amounts
awarded by the trial court, we do caution that M[w]e do not
intend our remand to be merely an exercise in bolstering and
supporting the conclusion already reached." Allred v. Allred,
141 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 16 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
ATTOPSEY FEES
Appellee was awarded attorney fees by the trial court
based on the difference in earning ability of the parties.
Appellant argues that this was an abuse of the trial court's
discretion in that appellee failed to prove that she was in
financial need.
Before a trial court may award attorney fees in a divorce
matter, the requesting party must show that award of attorney
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fees is "reasonably needed by the party requesting the award."
Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah 1986). In essence,
appellee must show that she would be "unable to cover the costs
of litigation." Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 1980).
The trial court, however, erroneously concluded that
attorney fees were warranted because "[p]laintiff's ability to
pay attorney fees is obviously much greater than that of
defendant."
In support of the trial court*s conclusion, appellee
cites Andersenv. Andersen, 757 P.2d 476, 480 (Utah Ct. App.
1988) for the proposition that disparity between the parties 1
abilities to pay is a sufficient ground upon which to find
need. We note, however, that in Andersen the "plaintiff
testified that she had iifl means with which to pay her fees."
Id,, at 480 (emphasis added). Appellee, on the other hand, has
significant means with which to pay her fees. ££. Huck, 734
P.2d at 420 (granting of attorney fees when party had no
"liquid assets").
In light of appellee's significant assets, we find that
she failed to meet her burden of proof that she reasonably
needed the award. We therefore vacate the trial court's award
of attorney fees. No cost or fees awarded on appeal.

Russell W. Bench, Judge

WE CONCUR:
r X<*M-^r_~i. S

4'4«**S***+m~

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

G r e g o r ^ K . O r m e , Judge
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March 3, 1989.
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IN TUt: FIRST JUDtCLAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHK
STATU OF UTAH
BRENT "W" BROWN,
,..,.,_
Plaintiff
v.

)
,
)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

)

Civil No,

24569

GERALDLNE K. BROWN,
)

Defendant
)

The parties were divorced in March of 1986.

The Plaintiff

prior to divorce was a partner in a company called Interyrated
Systems Engineering which he Later sold and was taken on as an
employee by the purchaser.

Testimony indicated that the year

prior to the divorce when he was in this situation his income
was $100,000.00+ annually.

At the time of the divorce, his income

was zero having terminated any employment.

At that time, based

on the prior track record of the plaintiff, indicated that he was
not going to remain at zero income and indicated that he had the
ability to generate income.
The Court estimiated an income of at least historically of
$54,000,00 minimum.

An alimony order of $200.00 per month was

granted based upon that projection and $300.00 per month per child
support for tluee children.

It was estimated that he would soon be

making cigain substantial monies was correct and was a conservative
estimate because the evidence shows that the year after his divorce
he purchased Intergrated Systems Engineering himself and his own
personal financial statement submitted to a bank in Septembpr,

Brown v. Brown
Civi L No. 2 4r>69
Page Two

1988 he declares now a net worth of $1,157,000.00 and an annual
income of $130,000.00 per year.
The defendant has filed a Petition

based on this change of

circumstances for an increase in child support and alimony.
Defendant has submitted as Exhibit 4, a financial statement updated
from the September 19 8 8 Financial Statement he submitted to the
bank in which he declares his monthly income of $10,000.00 per montl*
as only $6,000.00.

The Court recognizes that financial statements

submitted to banks for purposes of loans are probably inflated and
that financial statements submitted to the Court in divorce actions
are probably deflated, and the figure is somewhere inbetween.
The Court finds that in any event that there is a substantial
change of circumstances in the defendant's income and it does not
appear simply to be coincidental that his income the year before his
divorce was in the $100,000,004- category annually and no income at
the time of divorce and then two years later his income is in the
$130,000.00 range at le^st so reflected on the statements submitted
to the bank last September.
The Plaintiff testified that there was several reasons for the
decrease in his projected earnings in September, 19 88 and his now
present financial declaration.

Mainly being the type of business

he has and the necessity of liquidation of assets and the necessity
of decreasi'vlg his own income
problems.

monthly because of the business

lie eliminated his bonuses, and has liquidated his stocks

wherein he had formerly received interest and dividend income.

If

Brown v. Brown
Civil No. 24569
Page Three

this was because of the Petition for Modification was filed of cours
is not known and the Court will not assume that to be the case.
However, the Court feels his present financial declaration which
is liis Exhibit; 4, is more conservative than his actual income.
The Court feels that the $130,000.00 on his financial statement of
September 1988 which is deferent's Exhibit 3 is probably inflated.
The Court will depart from the established guidelines because
of the factor of the debt structure that was testified to by the
plaintiff in his business that he now solely owns but will use the
$72,000.00 September figure deducting therefrom the bonus commissior
and dividend income and arrive at a figure of $700.00 per month per
child as the modified order on child support payments.

The Court

feels this is equitable taking into account the debt structure of
Integrated Systems Engineering from where he received his income.
As factors on alimony you have to take into account his increased
ability to provide the standard of living
his income taking

-that is now compatable with

into account those factors listed in the English

case, the Jones case, and the Nelson case, taking

into account

to try to maintain as close as you can the same standard of living

at this time as was available before and an ability at the present
time to pay and the needs of the defendant.

The Court will therefor

increase the aiimony award to $500.00 per month.
Defendant is also asking attorney's fees for this.

Section

30-3-3 oC the U.C.A. has been interpreted to include actions Tor

Blown v. Blown
Civil Mo. 2 4 569
Paye Four

Modification.

Sec Kallas v. Kalias, 614 P. 2nd 641.

Plaintiff's

abiJity to pay attorney's fees is obviously much greater than
that of the defendant, the defendant only having the income that
she realizes from investment of funds she received from the divorci
plus her child support and alimony.

Defendant's counsel testified

as to the hours and the necessity of the amount of hours for
purpose of his hearing and the reasonablenes5 of his hour]y fee
and with the figure of around $4,000,00 attorney's fees.

However

in checking over his Exhibit showing the amcunt of time spent,
namely concerning the cost of the curb or gutter.

The Court feels

there are some items that were not necessar' and has therefore
reduced the attorney's fees award to $3,000,00 as opposed to
$4,000.00 plus costs.
Counsel for defendant to prepare the appropriate modi fication
order.
Dated this J j

gay of March, 1989.

Q

Stephen W. Jewell, 3814
Attorney at Law
15 South Main r Third Floor
First Security Bank Building
Loci an, Utah
84321
Telephonei
< 801) 7D3-2UUO
JN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE
STATE OF UTAH

BRENT "W* BROWN,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,

GERALDINFJ K. BROWN,
Civil No. 24569
Defendants

This matter came on hearing before the Court, the
Honorable VeMoy Chi~istoffex-sen presiding, on January 17, 1983
and again on February 20, 1989-

Defendant was present and

represented by counsel, Stephen W- Jewell-

Plaintiff

was

present only on February 28, 1989, and represented by counsel
on January 17, 1989, and February 28, 1989-

The Court

having

heard the evidence and testimonies presented ^rui the argument!
of counsel, and being fully advised In the premises, now finds
and concludes as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1*

The parties were divorced on or about March 18,

2-

Prior

1986.
to the divorcer

Plaintiff was a partner in a

company called INTEGRATED SYSTEMS ENGINEERING, which he later
Bold and war, taken on QJB an ^mplayerer

by the purchaser.

3*

Prior- to the divorce. Plaintiff *s income vas in

excess ol $1U0, OOu\ Uth
4*
?p/n f

At the time o_f the clivcace, Plaintill's income was

havifjg terminated any employment.
5.

nbilaty

At

the I i J».e of the divoree r

based on P l a i n t ! ft 's

to yeneiate income, the C O U J t estimated an income lor

Plnintill oi at least historically &54,OOO-OO minimum.

An

nliinony aider of &20th Oil pex

that

mant)i was granted based an

pi ojection and £HOO» OO per month .lor child support Xor

three

(3) children was ordered*.
€».

T)ie year following

the divorce,, ax- in or about

December 1986, Plaintill puichased INTEGRATED SYSTEMS
ENGINEERING himself and ciwiently

is the sole owner ol

INTEGRATED SYSTEMS ENGINEERING.
7*

Plaintiff's net worth as ol September 1988, was

approximately £1, 157. OOth CICh
8.

Although Plaintill represented on a financial

statement to Zion's First National Bank dated September 15,
1988,

that his annual income was $130,00th0Q per year.

Plaintiff testified at trial that his annual income was
actually only $72,OOCLOO^

The court recognizes that financial

statements submitted to banks for purposes of loans are
probably inflated and that financial statements submitted

to

the Court in divorce actions are probably deflated and that

Plaintiff's Income

is somewhere in between those tvo figures*

The court, however, declines to establish an exact income
figure*

2

SL

It does not appear* simply to be coincidental

that

Plaintili's income the year- belore his divorce was in the
s.tOOr OCiO.OO plus range annually and no

income at the Lime of

the divorce,, and then tvo yearrs later his income is again in
the $130,000.00 range, or at least so reflected on the
statement submitted
10.

to the bank in September of 1988.

The Court linds that in any event there is a

substantial and material change of circumstances in thai
Defendant's income has increased substantially Irow the time
of the divorcer
decree mid
11.
pe*

s«iiicie/it

to -warrant, a modification erf the

to grant Defendant's Petition*
The child support as previously ordered oi S200.00

month p&r child shal.i be modified and increased so that

Plaintiff shall pay £700* 00 p^x- month p^rr- child for child
support payments.
12.

Although

the Court is not specifically

following

the established child support guidelines, the Court feels this
is equitable taking into account the debt structure of
INTEGRATED SYSTEMS ENGINEERING from y»h^x^

Plaintiff receives

his income.
13.

After taking into account as factors on alimony,.

Plaintiff's increased ability to provide the standard of
living that is now compatible with his income, taking into
account

those facto* s li£i--"d in the ENGLISH case, the JONES

case, and the NELSON case, and taking into account the Court's
attempt to maintain as close as possible the same stanclnrd of
living at this time as was available at the time oi

the

divorce and an ability at the present time for Plaintiff
3

to

provide support,

the r*&&c\& of Defendant, and the ability of

Defendant to provide Yx&r own support, the Court will,
Ujexelore r

modify

from S200- GO p&r
14.

th*. Decree and increase the alimony
month to SSOO* (JO p&x

award

month*

The Court finds that the £4*000*00 paid by

Defendant for curb and gutter assessments are the obligation
oJ

the Defendant as the owner of the home and are not the

obligation of Plaintiff*
15*
fees r

Defendant's counsel testified regarding

attorney's

showing the time spent, the hourly rate charged,, and

the

necessity of the number of hours spent in light of the
difficulty of the case.

Jt was stipulated by counsel fox

the

Plaintiff that the rate charged was a reasonable one and was
commonly charged fax
finds,

such actions in the community*

The Court

that Plaintiff's ability to pay attorney's fc&B

obviously much greater than that of Defendant*

is

Defendant only

having the income that Bit^ realizes from investment of

lundB

she received from the divorce plus her child support and
alimony*

However, in checking over the exhibit provided by

Defendant's counsel showing the amount of time spent*
court f&&lB

that there are some items that were not necessary;

namely, concerning
therefore* finds

the costs of curb and gutter* the Court*

that a reasonable award of attorney's 1GT(?B to

Defendant from Plaintiff is S3*GOO*OO r
16*

the

plus costs*

There having been no evidence regarding

Counterpetition*

Plaintiff's

and a Motion to Dismiss the Counterpeti tion

having been made by Defendant's counsel at the conclusion of
Plaintiff's case and chief*

and Plaintiff indicating
4

his

intent, to withdraw bin: Coun lex petition,, the Court finds that
the Courjterpet.it.icm ehould be dismissed,
17.

The Court incorporates herein by T-&jL&T&nc:.f? such

other facts and findings as are stated in the Memorandum
Decision dated March 3, 1989*
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters
the following:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

There has h&&n a substantial and material change in

circumstances in Plaintiff's income and ability to provide
child support and alimony from the time of the decree,, and
that said substantial and material change is sufficient to
warrant a modification of the Decree of Divorce entered in
this matter.
2.

In view ol

the substantial and material change in

circumstances,, the court concludes that l)Gr£&ndBnt*&

Petition

to Modify as to child support and alimony should be granted
and that child support should be increased to $700* OO per
month per child and that alimony should be increased to
$-500.00 p&r
3*

month.
The Court further concludes £4,000.. 00 paid

hy

Defendant for curb and gutter assessment is the obligation of
Defendant as the owner of the prop&yrty

obligation erf the Defendant*

and, therefore, the

Defendant's Petition as to said

curb and gutter assessment should not be granted.
4.

In

veiw of the c\xflBr&nc.&

in earning ability and

actual income received by both parties, Defendant has

suli ic.ien t ly demonstrated
lees.

the linancial n€r€>t\ lor* attorney's

The cou/ t concludes that £3,GOO*GO Is a reasonable

amount lor attorney's

IG'^EX

and that the number ol hours spent

were necessary in light ol the dilliculty ol the case, the
rate charged lor attorney's lees vae reasonable as stipulated
by opposing counsel and is commonly charged lor divorce
actions in the community and
is based on the n^&d

that the award ol attorney's lees

and results acbeived in the case*

wu

Plaintill's Count ex-petition should be dismissed.

€>»

The Order and Judgment entered in this matter shall

be ellectlve as ol January 17 r 1989*
7»

The Court incorporates herein by reference such

other conclusions ol law as are stated in the Memorandum
Decision dated March 3, 1989*
DATED this

J.

clay ol Maireh*, 1989.

BY THE COURT:

Vr.,

.v:' CHRIoTCiT^r.ScN

VeHoy C h r i s t o f f e r s e n
D i s t r i c t Judge

G

CERTIFICATE UF MAILING
I hereby cextily Uiot on the _0[jj^ day of March r 1989, I
mailed a true and correct copy o:f the loregoing Findings of
Fact and Conclusioifis ui Lav and Notice to the foregoing
pernoinEi, postage pre-paid theieon r by depositing in the United
Stnt.pp. Maii»

Richard B- Johnson
Attorney at Law
1327 South 800 East, Suite 3UO
Clrem, UT
84G58
Brent VL Brown
1622 East lOttO North
Logan, UT 84321

Aj>U
NUTICE
Counsel lor Plaintiff is hereby notified that pursuant
Rule 4-504(2) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration,
counsel has five (5) days to submit any objections to the
Court*
DATED thlE^T^T 7 ;

day of March, 198SL

^S^2<^^Z.

7

to

S t e p h e n W. J e w e l l , 3 8 1 4
A t t o r n e y lor- Defendant.
15 S o u t h M a i n , Thir-d F l o o r
F i r s t S e c u r i t y Bank B u i l d i n g
L o g a n , Utah
843^1
Telephone;
(8CU > 7 5 3 - 2 0 0 0
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VeHoy C h r i s t o f f e r e e n

represented

No.

*•

Tlxis m a t t e r

are

JUDGMENT

*

vo,

of

CACHE

«

Plaintiff,

and

OF

Decree of

respectively,

of

Divorce,
shall

be

and

ui*

It

IB

ui dei ed that

child support

BJIBII

increRBP

/rein S3DO. GO to $700.GO per month per child.
3.

It I B h u Uier urdeiecl that alimony shall increase

ixoin $200.00 to $500.00 pes month.
4.

Said mod 11 ted child evifijior t and alimony

shall be paid elfective as oX January 17,

payments

1989, and DeXendant

is ip anted a judgment, against PlaintiXX lor all amounts owing
Xi oift t.hat date to the date oX this order.
5.

The ThiDf d and Four th Cause© ol Action in

Delendant's Petition to ModiXy Decree oX Divorce regarding
road assessments and withholding oX child support and punitive
damages shall be and are hereby denied.
6.

DeXendant shalI be and is hereby awarded a judgment

against PIaintiXX as and for attorney's Xees in the amount oX
S3,GOO.00.
7.
previously
8.

All other provisions oX the Decree entered
xn

this action shall remain as stated.

PlaintiXX's Counter-Petition is denied and

shall be and as he* eby dismissed.
DATED this _ll

day oXttstosh,1989.

BY THE COURTl

afoNO.Y. CHKurv.
YeHoy ChristoXXersen
District Judge

7>

the same

CEKTIJMCAIE UF WAILING
I h e r e h y c e r t i f y t h a t o n 1 h e ^ _?!_ flay o f M a r c h ,
m a i l e d a t r u e a n d c c a / e c t c o p y ojf t h e f o r e g o i n g O r d e r
J u d g m e n t and N o t i c e t o t h e X o r e q o i n q p e r s o n s , p o s t a g e
t h e r e o n , by d e p o r i t i n y .UJ t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s M a i l *

Richard

B.

A t t r a rjpy

JuhriF.oii

at

haw

1 3 2 7 S c m t h *UK» Er*Fit,
Ur&w, Ur
84US8
Br e n t

W-

BJT

1B22 E a p t
L o g a/J,

1^89, I
and
pre-pai

S u i t e 3CKI

ovn

lOfUl

11 f

North

843^1

sT/
/ -

NOTICE
( uiujt-el

IUJC

R u l e 4~^i04<2)
couiifiel

hac

al

five

PlaiuUfl

IB

hereby

t h e Utah Code o l
(5)

days

notified

Judicial

d

Administx a tion,

t o Eiibwi t a n y o b j e c t i o n s

Lour t *
DA'JED this _JJL-

that, p m s u a n t

» y ci Watch, 1989.

/

3

>

•

/

to

the

t

